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Professor Fields has presented an interesting paper on a problem important in its own 
right and connected with other challenging themes such as the nature of stereotyping and 
the justifiability of racial profiling. The many questions arising here illustrate the 
intersection of epistemological questions with ethical and political ones. 
 The topic of testimony points to a significant fact about human knowledge; it can 
be limiting to think of knowledge in terms of knowing whether, and why, propositions 
are true. As has been ably argued by C.A.J. Coady, Jonathan Adler and others, to acquire 
knowledge of the world, we need to rely on what other people tell us. To know, we need 
to believe other people. 
Professor Fields was kind enough to refer to my own work on the topic of social 
trust. My book on social trust was published in 1997 and completed several years before 
that. I had to consult it to find the ‘searing’ examples Fields refers to, which appear in 
Chapter Nine. In Chapter Three of that work, and in several published articles, I explored 
themes of trust and testimony and some of my conclusions were similar to those in 
Fields’ paper. His work reveals several places where mine needs amendment. 
 I suggested understanding our reliance on testimony and our trust in what others 
tell us in terms of three stages: 
 
1. The innocent trust of the small child, learning language, customs, and basic facts 
from his or her parents; 
2. The default trust of people beyond early childhood, who assume that what others 
tell them should be accepted as true unless there is some specific reason to reject 
it; 
3. Reflective trust (or distrust) based on a scrutiny when there is some reason not to 
take testimonial claims at face value. One reflects on whether or not to accept 
another’s claim that P as some evidence that P is true. 
 
We are concerned in Fields’ paper with what I called reflective trust and with the 
question of the transition from default trust to reflective trust. What sorts of questions 
should be raised at this point? What should unseat the default condition and push a person 
into the reflective phase? I had considered: 
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a. Is the speaker asserting some proposition P, in uttering U? 
b. Does the hearer have reasons, pertaining to the content of P, to regard P as 
implausible? 
c. Is the speaker honest in asserting P? 
d. Is the speaker competent with regard to knowing whether P? 
 
Where Fields speaks of utterances, I prefer propositions; where he speaks of sincerity, I 
spoke of honesty. But these differences need not concern us here. His paper shows me 
that I neglected to consider several further aspects. These are: 
 
e. Does the speaker have a vested interest in asserting P? 
f. Is the speaker a member of some class such that there is a reliable reason to 
believe that persons in this class are unreliable with regard to such claims as P? 
 
Now you might suppose that (e), vested interest, is an unnecessary addition, being 
covered by the general theme of honesty. However, Fields’ example of the allegations 
made regarding gay and lesbian testimony about their lifestyle raises the possibility of 
motivated irrationality or even self-deception. One can have a kind of bias due to having 
psychic vested interest in believing something. One might honestly believe something in 
an area where, in general, one is competent, but one might be unreliable due to this bias. 
A person could sincerely assert (for example) that her daughter was a strong student 
while being self-deceived about the extent of her abilities. The possibility that a lesbian or 
gay person might be unreliable in testimony about his or her lifestyle (as alleged by Focus 
on the Family) points to this sort of problem. 
 But I will not pursue this matter further here. What is really of interest, of course, 
is the last point (f), with regard to group or class membership. I agree with Fields and 
with Adler that in some cases, group membership are relevant to judgments of credibility, 
and that questions of theory and practice here are both interesting and tricky.  
 Fields refers sometimes to the ‘class’ to which a speaker belongs and sometimes 
to ‘group membership.’ These two notions are not in all contexts equivalent. Any 
predicate can serve to form a class: thus we have the class of persons under six feet tall, 
the class of never-married redheads, and so on. But the word “group” is often used so as 
to imply some degree of identification, a significance of the group in structuring one’s 
identity, and perhaps some level of organization of the group. In this sense, there is a 
class of never-married redheads, but there is no group of never-married redheads. 
Interesting questions may be posed about classes and groups. For instance, we may define 
a class of Chinese-Canadians, but it is disputable whether Chinese-Canadians constitute a 
group. The distinction is relevant to the topic at hand, I think, because to the extent that a 
group has cohesion and organization, its members are more likely to share relevant 
qualities regarding assertion-making, honesty, reliability, and vested interest. 
  Another pertinent matter is the voluntariness of one’s membership in a class or 
group. In Fields’ paper we see the following examples of classes or groups: ground-based 
observers, used car salesmen, purveyors of diet pills, gypsy fortune tellers, lesbians, gays, 
and Focus on the Family (an organized group). One is a ground-based observer by 
circumstance and in some particular context; one presumably does not choose this. But 
then neither is a person’s lack of credibility as a ground-based observer likely to be an 
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ethically significant handicap in life; thus whether someone refuses to accept his or her 
testimony as a ground-based observer is of little ethical or political concern. Being a used 
car salesman or a purveyor of diet pills is voluntary; being a fortune teller is presumably 
voluntary -- though being a gypsy is involuntary or semi-voluntary. Whether being 
lesbian or gay is voluntary is debatable and debated; being an affiliate of Focus on the 
Family is clearly so. I mention these points because I think that it is not only 
epistemically, but ethically and politically, more acceptable to consider an individual’s 
membership as relevant to credibility when it is chosen than when it is not. You will, 
perhaps, get a sense of what I mean if you compare the groups mentioned in Fields’ paper 
with classes based unchosen characteristics, such as being female or Aboriginal. 
Epistemically, if a person makes a choice such that a characterization applies to him or 
her (as in used car salesman or fortune teller) there is a greater reason to judge credibility 
by reference to that classification; the choice presumably reflects something about this 
person.  
 I agree with what Fields says about Elizabeth Fricker’s approach, which denies a 
default view about accepting testimony. Fricker’s strict proposal requires that hearers 
constantly monitor speakers for their untrustworthiness and make case-by-case decisions 
on their honesty and competence on the basis of such monitoring. Her view is 
theoretically problematic due to its denial of the default account of testimony. In her 
refusal to address the general problem of the acceptability of testimony, Fricker skirts a 
basic epistemological problem. She seems in effect to assume that there are background 
beliefs independent of testimony that can be applied to monitor trustworthiness. As Fields 
points out, her account would be operationally problematic if we were to apply it strictly. 
Cooperative social life would not be possible on this basis. Trying to render her account 
user-friendly, Fricker softens it to the point where she allows even for hearers to rely on a 
‘sense’ of what sort of person another is, regarding competence and honesty; one can 
have a conviction that ‘one can tell’ that another person is unreliable, even when one does 
not know how. But then the account is operationally too soft. We are almost on the level 
of not believing someone on the grounds that ‘I could tell there was something fishy 
about him.’ Thus Fricker’s account does not work. Theoretically, it is flawed and 
operationally it is either too demanding, if unamended, and not demanding enough, if 
amended.  
 Can Fields avoid the same problem? He avoids the central theoretical problem: he 
accepts the default view that a hearer should give some credence to a speaker’s testimony 
unless there is good reason to do otherwise. But curiously, a key dimension is missing 
here. That is the issue of whether the generalization R applies to this particular individual 
S. This of course is a key matter, central to the whole problem. Suppose that the 
generalization R about the unreliability of the class of group within which the speaker is 
being located, is itself well-grounded and not disconfirmed by scientific investigation or 
personal experience in the ways Fields considers. Even assuming that this is the case, will 
we not be committing the fallacy of division if we apply R straightforwardly to the 
individual S without considering whether S might, within this group, be someone to 
whom the generalization R does not apply? An earlier condition in Field’s account 
requires that the hearer be non-culpably unaware that there is a reason specific to S, to 
believe that S is insincere or incompetent with regard to the claim made. This condition 
requires the hearer attend to the speaker as an individual. Later, I believe that the hearer 
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will need again to attend to the speaker as an individual, reflecting on whether there could 
be reason to think R does not apply to him or her. To avoid this problem on a theoretical 
level, we need another proviso. But if we add another proviso, the problem of demanding 
too much complexity for operational realism worsens. 
 Let me try to explain what I mean here. The question arises: can Fields avoid the 
operational problem? In other words, does Fields own account impose unrealistic burdens 
on people regarding daily interactions? (Is it user-friendly, as Fricker’s unamended 
theoretical account is not?) This seems to me to be the key question, but I am unclear 
quite how to focus it. In his complex formulation, Fields proposes conditions of H having 
evidence to believe P on the basis of an assertion by a speaker to H, that P. The wording 
here makes it seems as though Fields is addressing the epistemologist’s question -- when 
does H have such evidence? – as distinct from attempting to give user-friendly 
operational advice. If he is restricting himself to theoretical epistemology, perhaps these 
operational questions do not arise. But if we do interpret Fields as offering an account on 
this operational level, there are problems. The account then seems to require both too 
much and too little. It allows reference to judgments about class membership as relevant 
to judgments of a speaker’s sincerity and competence. In that sense, it can be said to be 
realistic, more so than Fricker’s account. But the stipulated provisos here may well 
require too much. The judgments must be in some sense well-grounded, based on polling 
evidence or extensive personal experience. And it is required that the hearer have 
investigated his or her own generalization to determine that it is not grounded on 
fallacious reasoning and has not been overturned by other research of observation. While 
such reflections are theoretically sensible, it is not realistic to think that people could go 
through this much thought in day-to-day evaluation of testimony. And if we add a further 
proviso requiring that the hearer reflect on whether the generalization might fail to apply 
to this particular individual, the speaker, the problem becomes worse. 
 Despite the excellence of this paper, I am not convinced that this thorny problem 
has been solved. The need to avoid the fallacy of division pushes us back to considering 
the individual speaker as such, and the complexity of the provisos make the account 
implausible if we interpret it as intended to guide ordinary practice. 
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